[FONT=Arial, Helvetica][SIZE=+2]Early-warning Systems[/SIZE][/FONT]
[SIZE=+1]The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and the danger of escalation to higher levels of warfare if even one or two were used, makes governments possessing nuclear weapons anxious to guarantee their use only when absolutely necessary. Consequently, great care has been taken to perfect the systems that control nuclear weapons, and systems for Command, Control, and Communication, or C[/SIZE][SIZE=-1]3[/SIZE][SIZE=+1]. [/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]Closely connected to this system for controlling forces are the systems used to determine the size and capabilities of potentially hostile forces and to provide warning of an impending attack. Most of these activites are now performed by the many kinds of sensors carried by space satellites and by ground-based radars such as the three U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) that are located in Alaska, Greenland, and England.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]The systems for preventing unintended use of nuclear weapons can be divided into three categories:[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]safety devices to prevent accidental explosions or launching of weapons[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]laws and military discipline for making sure that people obey orders[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]devices to prevent people from acting without authority[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]While military discipline is nothing new, the special dangers of nuclear weapons have inspired ingenious physical controls. Weapons are being guarded with electronic locks that require the insertion of a code number before operators can act. These are often supplemented by devices that will make the weapon unusable if anyone tries to bypass the locks.[/SIZE]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica][SIZE=+2]Surveillance Satellites[/SIZE][/FONT]
[SIZE=+1]Satellites provide their owners with much information about the activities of other countries and also provide useful reassurance that nothing too dangerous is happening or that an atttack is not imminent. If nuclear war were tragically to occur, satellites could help to control it by providing reliable information about what was actually happening and therefore, could reduce the typical confusion that is often referred to as the "fog of war." [/SIZE]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica][SIZE=+2]Antimissile Weapons[/SIZE][/FONT]
[SIZE=+1]It takes only a very few of the larger nuclear weapons to create great destruction. Power nuclear warheads are now only a few feet in length so they can be delivered by ballistic missiles, which cannot be stopped by traditional air defenses. For many years, it was thought that no defense was possible against ballistic missiles, but now the situation has changed. This is an important development because the revolution created by nuclear weapons would be significantly reversed if effective defenses against missiles were to be developed.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]In the past, developments in rocketry and in electronic guidance made it possible for one rocket to intercept another and destroy it. But while it was possible to intercept single test rockets, catching all of a numerous incoming attack still seemed impossible. As it only took a few penetrations to cause a disaster, U.S. experts did not think building a defensive network was worth the great expense. A further reason to be doubtful about ballistic missile defenses then was the probable ease with which an attacker could make the defender's job more difficult. Although the most expensive, the simplest way would be to buy more offensive missiles to "saturate" the defense. Cheaper ways would be to equip reentry vehicles with devices such as chaff and decoys--lightweight imitations that acted like the real thing while outside the atmosphere--to confuse the defensive radar.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]There are also broader arguments against ballistic missile defenses, and one is that such defenses could accelerate an arms race such as the Cold War mentioned in the
nuclear past section. Many people believe that if all parties in a nuclear balance of power know they have no defense, they will be cautious and content with fairly small attacking forces. But if an attacker faced with defenses, tries to get through by increasing the size of its attack, the result might be more rather than less destruction if the defenses failed. On the other hand, if one side were confident in its defense, it might be more tempted to use its own offensive forces. It was this kind of thinking that led to the U.S. and the Soviet Union signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. That treaty limited each side to one defended area. The Soviet Union has one around Moscow, but the United States has yet to build the system permitted by the treaty.[/SIZE]
[FONT=Arial, Helvetica][SIZE=+2]Star Wars [/SIZE][/FONT]
[SIZE=+1]Although the challenge of intercepting a reentry vehicle was technologically mastered in the 1960s, it still seemed impossible to offer a really worthwhile defense to a full-scale sttack. By the 1980s, however, a variety of technological advances had made such a defense seem possible. Because space operations played such an important role in these efforts, the U.S. program, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), became known as Star Wars.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]Many differeny technologies contributed to this new optimism. Radars had become more efficient, and computers were much more capable of rapidly processing the information they received. Interceptor rockets could more quickly meet attacking warheads and, where earlier systems had to rely on nuclear explosions to destroy hostile reentry vechiles, more accurate interception made it possible to employ non-nuclear kill methods such as conventional explosions and shrapnel-like clusters of solid projectiles, or kinetic kill. the most Star Wars-like idea was to use laser beams from the ground or from satellites to damage offensive vehicles. As rockets rose slowly and vulnerably from the ground with all their later-to-be-dispersed multiple warheads aboard, they might be destroyed by kinetic or laser deviecs in satillites over enemy launch-sites. These ideas offered the possibility of a layered defense, whereby the offensive force would be attacked during all three stages of its flight: the boost phase, the mid-course phase, and the reentry, or terminal, phase. Thus, the defense would have several chances to attack and could enjoy a good overall performance, even if each phase had been only partially successful.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]There are still many difficulties with a layered defense, however, and many of the necessary devices are still in the experimental stage. It is particularly difficult to get the necessary energy for lasers into space because the atmosphere has the effect of shielding the ground. Moreover, the attacker can use countermeasures such as decoys and can "harden," or strengthen, its weapons against lasers. It can also increase the acceleration of its boosters to permit the separation of the warheads while they are still within the atmosphere, which will give them some shielding from lasers. They enemy can, of course, also nicrease the attack by aircraft or cruise missiles, which means the defender must also have a good antiaircraft system.[/SIZE]
[SIZE=+1]Once an option becomes technologically possible, its usefulness always depends on the cost. for instance, can an attacker afford to maintain the effectiveness of its attack? Most experts belive it will be a long time, if ever, before a "leak-proof umbrella of defense" can be built. But before then, defenses may become efficient enough to reduce an attacker's confidence in success and thus promote deterrence.[/SIZE]